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1.  Introduction 
  
  There has been a resurgence of interest in the role of social interactions in 
determining the rate at which technologies are adopted (Bandiera and Rasul (2006), Burke, 
Fournier, and Prasad (2007), Conley and Udry (2007), Goolsbee and Klenow (2002), 
Manski (2004,2006), Munshi (2004), Skinner and Staiger (2005), Young (2007)).  Some of 
these recent efforts represent an attempt at resolution of early debates that emerged when 
Griliches produced his seminal work on the adoption of hybrid corn varieties in agriculture 
(1957,1958).  Griliches was criticized by rural sociologists Havens and Rogers (1961) 
among others for ignoring the social determinants of adoption decisions
1.  An important 
methodological implication of the new social interactions and adoption literature is that it 
shows that economic incentives and social influences may be synthesized so that any 
antithesis assumed between economic and social explanations is a false one; private 
incentives and social incentives are both compatible with the choice-based logic that 
Griliches developed.   
  This paper focuses on the properties of a particular rational expectations model 
of heterogeneous atomistic potential adopters.  “Social interactions” in the context of this 
model constitute positive feedback external spillover effects from the fraction having 
already adopted to the payoff received by each agent who has adopted; this type of social 
interaction has been dubbed “endogenous” by Manski (1993) as it involves feedback from 
the behaviors (as opposed to characteristics) of others onto each individual.   Our objective 
is to identify properties of adoption curves that imply the presence of social interactions 
under relatively weak assumptions.  Of course, any judgment on whether these 
assumptions are weak enough to be plausible will depend on context. In motivating our 
analysis in various places, we will return to the hybrid corn example, which continues to be 
of interest; Skinner and Staiger (2005) and Sutch (2008) are recent studies that revisit 
Griliches’ analysis.    The general literature on adoption of new technologies, network 
effects, learning effects, and the relationship of adoption to general social interactions is 
very large and had moved far beyond Griliches’s early studies; see the survey by Hoppe 
(2002), but the hybrid corn example remains an exemplar.   
                                                 
1See David (2005) for a discussion of this debate.  2 
 
    We characterize equilibria for rational adopters who maximize intertemporal 
profits.  This characterization is oriented towards uncovering observational implications of 
social interactions on adoption curves that are robust to various types of observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity.  In doing this, we are particularly concerned to identify 
observable implications that are robust to t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  h e t e r o g e n e i t y .    T o  o u r  
knowledge the integration of social interactions into a rational expectations model of 
atomistic heterogeneous potential adopters and the study of the observational implications 
for the adoption curve is new.
2   We recognize that for many questions the adoption curve 
may be of less interest than other features of patterns of adoption (e.g. delays in adopting 
superior technologies, patterns of strategic interaction between a small number of major 
players, etc.), especially for policy making.  Independent of any intrinsic interest in 
adoption curves, our analysis argues these curves may be used to uncover social interaction 
effects of the type that have been a primary focus of the recent literature, and can do so in a 
way that requires relatively weak assumptions by a researcher
3 
  Our analysis reveals two properties that may assist empirical researchers in 
interpreting some interesting patterns in the data.  First, we demonstrate that social 
interactions can produce jumps in the fraction of a population who have adopted by a 
particular date
4.  Second, we demonstrate that social interactions can produce pattern 
reversals in which agents whose private characteristics suggest they would adopt earlier than 
others but in fact adopt later.  The potential for pattern reversals follows from the 
requirement that agents with greater ability to profit from a new technology adopt before 
those with relatively lesser ability.  The reason that this requirement empirically 
                                                 
2See Aradillas-Lopez (2007), Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b,2007), Graham (2008), 
Ioannides and Zabel (2008), Lee (2007) and Manski (1993) for examples of the relevant 
econometric literature on social interactions.  
3Geroski (2000 p. 1) argues that the “dominant stylized fact” concerning new technology 
diffusion is that “the usage of new technologies over time typically follows an S-curve.”  He 
goes on to organize the diffusion literature according to whether this shape is due to social 
factors (what he calls an epidemic model) or individual factors (what he calls a probit 
model).  Our analysis combines both explanations into a single model and considers what 
robust implications follow from the presence of social factors. We discuss the question of 
S-shaped adoption curves in Section 6.  
4The capacity of rational expectations to produce interesting jumps in equilibrium variables 
has long been recognized; see Sargent and Wallace (1973) for a classic example. 3 
 
distinguishes cases with and without social interactions is that under monotonic (in ability) 
adoption curves, lower ability agents face an environment in which a larger percentage of 
the population will have adopted than higher ability ones and hence may experience 
stronger social interaction effects because they adopt at a later date.  In order to reconcile 
the difference in the strength of social interactions with the monotonicity requirement in 
adoption times and individual ability, discontinuities can occur.  As for pattern reversals, 
the presence of discontinuities within adoption curves with respect to unobservables can 
break the monotonicity of adoption with respect to observables.     
  To be clear, neither of these properties is necessary for the presence of social 
interactions, and each is sufficient only in conjunction with additional assumptions on the 
adoption process.  That said, the relatively weak nature of these assumptions (compared to 
others that appear in the literature) combined with the fact that these patterns only occur 
when social interactions are large (in a sense made precise below), provide strategies for 
empiricists to uncover social influences in adoption.
5  While we certainly do not claim to 
have established that either discontinuities or pattern reversals constitute a sine qua non of 
observable implications of social interactions in adoption contexts, we do believe they 
represent useful directions for uncovering social influences on individual behavior.  As 
such, we follow a research strategy in the social interactions literature developed in Brock 
and Durlauf (2007), Graham (2008) of trying to identify implications of social interactions 
that hold for an array of assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity and so may be regarded 
as robust implications
6.  Concerns that unobserved heterogeneity can mask social 
                                                 
5We thank an anonymous referee for this formulation. 
6The ability of discontinuities and pattern reversals to reveal social interaction effects in 
adoption curves does not rely on the existence of multiple equilibria, which is the source of 
the pattern reversal findings in Brock and Durlauf (2007).  Rather, it follows from the 
requirement that agents with greater ability to profit from a new technology adopt before 
those with relatively lesser ability.  The reason this requirement empirically distinguishes 
cases with and without social interactions is that lower ability agents face an environment in 
which a larger percentage of the population will have adopted than higher ability ones and 
hence may experience stronger social interaction effects.  In order to reconcile the 
difference in the strength of social interactions with the monotonicity requirement in 
adoption times and individual ability, discontinuities and pattern reversals can occur.  The 
uncovering of evidence of social interactions via multiple equilibria would require repeated 4 
 
influences were formalized at least as far back as Granovetter (1978); our findings suggest 
one way to constructively proceed. 
  This approach to uncovering social interactions complements the set of strategies 
that have been previously proposed to uncover social influences in adoption.  For example, 
Strang and Tuma (1993) propose estimation methods for spatial and temporal 
heterogeneity in adoption; this is done by making parametric assumptions on the adoption 
times process and treating unobserved heterogeneity as independent and identically 
distributed across agents.  Similarly, Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) use individual level data 
to estimate social influences by regressing individual adoption decisions on past aggregate 
adoption decisions in cities.  This type of strategy presupposes a richer microeconomic 
data set than we do in order to construct individual-specific control variables as well 
functional form assumptions on the payoff function to adoption.  It further relies on 
instrumental variables strategies for controlling for self-selection and unobserved group 
effects, the validity of which requires strong assumptions on the nature of the unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Regression approaches have recently been augmented by analyses that use 
information social networks to help facilitate identification of social effects, e.g. Burke, 
Fournier, and Prasad (2007) and Conley and Udry (2007); these approaches also rely on 
functional form assumptions in developing inferences.  Another approach to uncovering 
social interactions in adoption is due to Skinner and Staiger (2005) who employ cross state 
differences in adoption rates and their correlations with social capital measures to argue 
that social interactions are present. Analyses of that type require strong exchangeability 
assumptions about state-level behavior which may be problematic.
7 Our approach of course 
relies on a range of assumptions as well, hence our emphasis that we provide a 
complement to other strategies.  
  In terms of economic structure, two papers are closest to ours.  Cabral (1990), in 
what appears to be a relatively neglected contribution, studies adoption curves when social 
interactions (in his language, network externalities) are present and shows how 
                                                                                                                                                 
observations of the same environment, so that differences in the equilibrium outcomes can 
be used to infer the presence of the multiplicity.  No such mechanism is available here.  
7Brock and Durlauf (2001c) discuss the analogous difficulty in the context of cross-country 
growth regressions; see Durlauf (2002) for a discussion of the difficulties of using 
regressions to infer social capital effects. 5 
 
discontinuities in adoption curves may result.
8  We differ from Cabral first in terms of our 
analysis of forward looking agents who face dynamic profit flows and second in our analysis 
of observable implications in the presence of various types of heterogeneity.
9  Our analysis 
also shares much in common with Young (2007) who compares the properties of adoption 
models with and without different types of social interactions, and like us focuses on 
uncovering properties of adoption curves that are robust to heterogeneity.  While our goals 
are similar, our microstructures and analyses are not. We analyze environments in which 
adopters are forward looking whereas Young focuses on myopic adjustment rules that 
correspond to different types of social interactions.  Heterogeneity in Young’s analysis is 
associated with parameters of these adjustment processes whereas ours concerns 
observable and unobservable individual productivity.  We find that social interactions 
produce different observable implications from those identified by Young.  Unlike Young, 
we do not differentiate between types of endogenous social interactions.   
 
 
2.  Basic model 
  
  We model potential adopters as rational farsighted individuals who choose 
adoption times.  We claim no novelty for the microeconomic specification of this forward 
looking model with the important exception of the introduction of social interactions.   
Variations on the model without social interactions appear in several papers in Punzo 
(2001); Brock (2001) also gives a review of some of this type of literature
10. 
                                                 
8We became aware of Cabral’s paper after writing the first draft of this one. We wish to 
emphasize Cabral’s priority in uncovering the discontinuity property for adoption, despite 
differences in our microeconomic specifications.  
9Other papers share important similarities with our analysis and Cabral’s.  de Paula (2007) 
studies a model of synchronization in the presence of social interactions.  This analysis 
produces interdependences in hazard functions for individuals and in turn is related to 
Brock and Durlauf (2001b) and especially Sirakaya (2006) each of which directly embeds 
social interactions in a duration framework. Adsera and Ray (1998) consider a dynamic 
migration model with spillovers and show that lags in the effects of social interactions can 
eliminate multiple equilibria.  
10Reinganum’s pioneering work (1981a,1981b) is an especially important predecessor in as 
it provides adoption settings in which decisions are interdependent because of the 6 
 
  Formally, we consider a population of individuals each of whom chooses an 
adoption time t in order to maximize the present discounted value of current and future 
profits.  We allow for heterogeneity across the individuals, by associating each individual 
with a scalar  x which may be interpreted as individual ability. Ability should be understood 
as indexing individual productivity; we take no stance on its determinants as it is treated as 
exogenous to the model.  This heterogeneity is drawn from some continuously 
differentiable distribution function  ( ) X F x  with associated density  ( ) X f x . The support of 
x is assumed to be an interval  [ ] ˆ 0, I x = , where  ˆ x may be infinite. 
 Individual  actors  choose adoption times t in order to maximize the objective 
function  () , Jtx defined as 
 
  () ( ) ( ) () () () ( ) ,e x p e x p ,
e
t Jtx tC a s x q s d s ρρ π
∞
=− − + − ∫  (1) 
 
In this expression ρ  is the discount rate, C  is the cost of adoption, a is the rate of 
technical progress,  () () ,
e x qs π  is expected profit flow at date s (which depends upon the 
type  x), where  ( )
e qs  is the expected fraction of adopters in the population who have 
adopted by date s.  The rate of technical progress is designed to proxy for quality 
improvements that augment the value of the adopted technology, such as improved 
software for computers.  We assume that all agents have the same expectations.  The 
dependence of profits on this fraction constitutes what we mean by social interactions.  
Relative to standard adoption models, the only innovation is the presence of  ()
e qs  in the 
profit function.  Our objective is to understand whether observed adoption behavior can 
reveal the role of social interactions in individual decisions.  
We make the following assumptions on various elements of this decision problem. 
                                                                                                                                                 
competitive structure.  Reinganum shows that this force alone (with no heterogeneity across 
individual actors) is enough to produce many Nash equilibria with heterogeneous adoption 
times.  In her analysis, early adoption by one firm hurts the profitability of adoption by 
others, which is the opposite of social interaction effects we study. 
 7 
 
 
Assumption A.1. The discount rate exceeds the rate of technical progress, i.e. 0 a ρ −>. 
 
Assumption A.2. The expected level of adoptions at time t,  ()
e qt, is a piecewise 
differentiable, monotone nondecreasing function with a finite number of points of 
discontinuity.  For all t, conditional on  ( )
e qt  right derivatives are well defined and left 
limits exist.   
 
Assumption A.3. The profit function  ( ) , x q π  is strictly increasing in  x, weakly increasing 
in q and is twice continuously differentiable in ( ) , x q . 
 
Assumption A.4. Each potential adopter of type  x does not take into account the impact 
of his choice of adoption time t upon the adoption time choices of others.  
   
  A s s u m p t i o n  A . 1  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  m a k e  s u r e  t h a t  e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  m a x i m i z a t i o n  
problem is well defined; it simply ensures that the present discounted value of profits is 
bounded.  Assumption A.2 restricts the set of admissible beliefs by imposing a 
monotonicity requirement. This is substantively restrictive. We make the assumption in 
order to render the problem of characterization of the set of rational expectations equilibria 
tractable.
11  We conjecture that monotone beliefs may be plausible in microfounded 
models where adopters are learning about their new technology by newsletters, user 
groups, and other mechanisms of information transfer where the usefulness of the 
information transferred is increasing in the fraction that have already adopted the particular 
technology under scrutiny.  The assumption is also plausible in contexts where the new 
technology is generally understood to be one that will eventually become widespread; in the 
case of hybrid corn the US Department of Agriculture systematically proselytized on its 
                                                 
11The assumption is especially useful in finding rational expectations equilibria in that we 
follow the standard strategy in macroeconomics models of in essence conjecturing that 
agents form beliefs that have certain properties and then showing that these beliefs are 
justified in the equilibrium law of motion for the system.  8 
 
behalf (Sutch (2008)), so it seems reasonable to assume that farmers expected the use of 
hybrid corn to monotonically rise.  Similarly, one could imagine such beliefs for advances 
such as the Pentium chip that are recognized as state-of-the-art and certain to eventually 
supplant previous technologies. Assumption A.3 restricts the payoff function and is 
therefore substantive in its impositions of monotonicity, but is of course far weaker than 
assuming a particular functional form.  The requirement that the heterogeneity scalar x 
has a monotonic effect on profits limits what sorts of interpretation may be placed on it.  
The assumption that the profit function is increasing in q means that we are focusing on 
strictly positive interactions.  As such, the assumption is consistent with claims about 
network goods; Gandal (2008) surveys evidence of these effects for a very wide of contexts. 
Our analysis does not distinguish between mechanisms for network effects, i.e. a direct 
benefit from the adoption of a technology by others as occurs with a word processing 
program or information externalities by which the usage of a technology by others 
communicates relative payoffs to an individual or even factors such as increasing support 
structure for a technology based on market size
12. Assumption A.4 allows us to ignore 
strategic interactions, i.e. we treat each agent as atomistic.  The assumption is sensible when 
an individual adopter is small relative to the overall group. 
  All propositions stated in the paper assume at least some of A.1-A.4; for ease of 
exposition we assume all of them for each of our lemmas and theorems.  Further, we 
always assume that there is a finite date in the past when the new technology first appears 
and the first adoption occurs after that date; without loss of generality we designate the date 
at which the innovation first appears as 0.
13  Finally, we conceptualize each agent as 
                                                 
12Our blackbox approach to social interactions is common in the social interactions 
literature and indeed a limitation of the literature.  
13Sutch (2008) shows that this is precisely what happened in the case of hybrid corn.   
Hybrid corn was invented by Donald F. Jones in 1917-1918, was developed and 
introduced on a trial basis by Henry A. Wallace in 1924, was first sold commercially in 
1925, competitors began sales in 1928, and widespread commercial adoption began in 
1932.  In 1933 .1 percent of the nation’s corn acreage was planted in hybrid corn and by 
1960 hybrid corn was planted on 96.3 percent of the nation’s corn acreage. 1917 
corresponds to our  0 t = .   
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choosing an adoption time from ( ) ,T −∞ , this avoids problems of corner solutions in the 
optimization problem.   
  The first order necessary condition (FONC) and secondary order necessary 
condition (SONC) for the optimal adoption time 
* t  by type x are given by 
  
  () () ( ) () ( ) ( )
* 1
ln ln ,
e tx C x qt
a
ρπ =−  (2) 
 
and 
 
  () ( ) ( ) ()
( ) ( )
()
() 2 ,
exp ,
e e
e
e
xq t dq t
Ca t a x q t
qt d t
π
ρρ π
⎛⎞ ∂
⎜⎟ −≤ − +
⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
 (3) 
 
respectively for dates t, if  ()
e qt  is differentiable at t.  However, as will become clear, we do 
not wish to assume differentiability at all dates. If  ( )
e qt  is not differentiable at date t, 
observe that by A.3  () ( )
ee qt qt
−+ <  where “−” denotes the operation of taking the left 
limit and “+” denotes the operation of taking the right limit.  A local maximum is 
characterized (in our case) by the left limit being greater than the right derivative with a zero 
between these two values.  From (1), the first and second order necessary conditions for a 
local maximum at t  may be expressed as 
 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) () ()
,,
0
,,
ta t e
ta t e
Jtx e Ce x qt
Jtx e Ce x qt
ρ
ρ
ρπ
ρπ
−− −
+− +
′ = −≥
≥
′ =−
 (4) 
 10 
 
since this inequality can be decomposed in terms of the usual FONC and SONC, 
() () ,0 ,,0 Jt x Jt x ′′ ′ =≤  when  ( )
e qt  is differentiable at t.
14   
In the case where  ()
e qt  is differentiable at date t, the FONC is quite intuitive as it 
amounts to equating the marginal benefit to adoption at a given time with the associated 
marginal cost. To understand the SONC, rewrite (2) as 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) exp ,
e Ca t x q t ρπ = . (5) 
 
Substituting into (3), the second order condition holds if and only if 
 
  () ()
( ) ( )
()
() ,
0,
e e
e
e
xq t dq t
ax q t
qt d t
π
π
∂
≤+
∂
. (6) 
 
Equation (6) is satisfied provided that  ( ) ( ) ,0
e xq t π ≥   ( ) ( )
()
,
0
e
e
xq t
qt
π ∂
≥
∂
 and  ()
0
e dq t
dt
≥ .  
The first inequality is immediate from the FONC, since the cost of adoption is positive. 
The second inequality holds by Assumption A.3 above.  The third inequality cannot be 
assessed without specification of the expectations formation process. In our subsequent 
analysis  ()
0
e dq t
dt
≥  will be shown to hold in equilibrium under rational expectations.  In 
the case where  ()
e qt  is not differentiable at t we will show that  ( )( )
ee qt qt
− + ≤  holds in 
equilibrium.  Hence it will be the case that the SONC holds for interior critical points t for 
(2). If  () () ,0
e Cx q ρπ < , this is a signal that optimal t is some negative number for type 
x.  
  The following lemma provides a sufficient condition for uniqueness of an 
individual adoption time. 
 
                                                 
14Throughout, we write tt t
−+ ==  for the parts of functions that are continuous in t.  11 
 
Lemma 1. Uniqueness of optimal adoption time 
 
Given, A.1-A.5, the optimal time to adopt for each agent type exists and is unique.   
 
For comparative purposes, we note the case where there are no social interactions, 
i.e.   () () () ,
e x qt x ππ = .  In this case the optimal adoption times follow 
 
  () () ( ) ()
()
*
*
1
ln ln  if  ,
0 if 
tx C x xx
a
tx xx
ρπ =− <
<≥
 (7) 
 
where x  is defined by  ()
* 0 tx =  (if such an x  exists).  Observe that  ( )
* tx  is decreasing in 
x by Assumption A.3; this simply means that higher productivity types adopt earlier as the 
profit incentives are higher.   
 
 
3. Adoption curves and rational expectations equilibria 
 
We now consider equilibria under social interactions by imposing a rationality 
requirement on beliefs about adoption levels. This assumption may naturally be criticized, 
especially in the context of a technological innovation.  On the other hand, to the extent 
that our analysis is designed to compare environments with and without social interactions, 
expectations only matter when social effects are absent, hence deviations from rationality 
are not relevant under the “null hypothesis” that social effects are absent.   An interesting 
exercise, beyond the scope of this paper, is to understand whether plausible alternative 
expectations formation mechanisms can restrict adoption patterns in robust ways analogous 
to those we find.  
To develop a rational expectations equilibrium, observe first that, for any 
expectations process, one can construct the actual adoption curve  ( ) qt that describes the 
percentage of the population which has adopted by date t.  We first note a lemma. 12 
 
 
Lemma 2. Monotonicity of adoption with respect to ability 
 
Given A.1-A.4, suppose  11  and  tt xx << . If  1 x  adopts at time  1 t , then for all  1 x x < , the 
adoption time t of type x satisfies  1 tt ≥ . 
 
Monotonicity means that the adoption rate may be calculated using the formula 
 
  () ()
() () () 1 XX at qt f zd z F at
∞
== − ∫  (8) 
 
where the lower integral limit  () at is implicitly defined by 
 
  ( ) ( )
* ta t t = . (9) 
 
Eq. (8) means that there is a tight link between the adoption curve and the distribution 
function of the type-specific heterogeneity.  To understand eq. (9), recall that we have 
shown that for each x there exists a unique adoption time  ( )
* tx , a decreasing function 
which may be discontinuous, i.e.  ( ) ( )
** tx tx
− + >  may occur.  At continuity points of 
()
* tx , the associated inverse function is well defined and one can solve for the value 
() x at =  that satisfies (9) at date t.  At discontinuity points of  ( )
* tx  we use the right limit 
x
+ as x decreases towards the point of discontinuity.  This choice rule is consistent with 
Assumption A.2; this ensures that  ( )
e qt  is increasing in t. 
Since the profit functions are assumed to depend on the expected adoption curves 
of each agent, rational expectations equilibria thus are straightforward to define as they 
require that the beliefs about adoption rate coincide with the actual adoption rates along an 
equilibrium path.   
 
Definition: rational expectations equilibrium (REE).    13 
 
 
A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair of functions  ( )
* tx  and  ( )
* qt  such that  
 
i. individual adoption times are optimal, 
   
and  
 
ii. the aggregate adoption curve is consistent with these individually optimal choices. 
 
The requirements of a rational expectations equilibrium, implicitly characterizes the 
optimal adoption times. At points of differentiability, the optimal times must fulfill 
 
  () () ( ) () ( ) () ()
** * 1
ln ln ,  if  0 tx C x qt tx
a
ρπ =− >  (10) 
 
and the equilibrium fraction who have adopted by date t,  ( ) qt, must fulfill 
 
  () ( ) () () ( ) () () ( )
** * * Pr exp , 1 X qt xC a t xtqt F xt ρπ =− ≤ = − . (11) 
 
Substituting (11) into (10) 
 
  () ( ) () () () ( ) ()
** * 1
ln ln ,1 X tx C xt Fxt
a
ρπ =− −  (12) 
 
In contrast to this function, one can consider a best response function for each type 
in which the population fraction adopting corresponds to the distribution of types: 
 
  () () ( ) () ()
1
ln ln ,1 . X Sx C x F x
a
ρπ =− −  (13) 
 14 
 
This  () Sx function differs from  ( )
* tx  as it is the best response function for an individual 
without self-consistency imposed between the adoption time and adoption curves as an 
equilibrium condition. 
 
 
4. Restrictions on the shape of the adoption curve 
 
In this section, we consider how social interactions manifest themselves in observed 
adoptions decisions. We follow the tradition started with Griliches (1957) in placing 
primary emphasis on the shape of the equilibrium adoption curve  ()
* qt .  We consider 
how social interactions, in the sense that the profit function  (,) x q π  increases in both x 
and  q restricts this curve.  Our goal is to understand how restrictions emerge in light of 
heterogeneity as characterized by  ( ) X Fx  and the unobservability of  () , x q π .  In other 
words, we are interested in uncovering empirical implications of social interactions that are 
robust to unobserved heterogeneity in terms of individual types and the associated profit 
functions that characterize agents. 
  In order to develop restrictions on the shape of the adoption curve which are 
generateed by social interactions, we focus on eq. (13).   When social interactions are 
absent,  ()( ) , x qx ππ =  and so is monotonically increasing in x by Assumption A.3; this 
implies that  () Sx is monotonically decreasing as well.  On the other hand, when social 
interactions are present the  ( ) () ,1 X x Fx π −  in (13) is not necessarily increasing in x 
despite Assumption A.3 because  ( ) 1 X Fx −  is decreasing in x; by (13) nonmonotonicity 
may be transferred to  () Sx.   Intuitively, this means that, as a best response, higher ability 
agents may not find it as profitable to adopt as lower ability agents because of the absence 
of others who adopt at the same or earlier times. The breakdown, in the presence of social 
interactions, of the monotonicity of the profit function with respect to x and associated 
nonmonotonicity of  () Sx has important implications for the behavior for the observable, 
()
* qt .   15 
 
We start by concentrating on a form of  ( ) Sx such that 1)  ( ) 0 S =∞,  when  x is 
small, and 2) the function has a unique minimum  x.  Let  ( ) 1 x t  denote the smallest and 
() 2 x t  the largest solutions to  ( ) tS x = . We wish to demonstrate that  () 1 x t  can be part of 
a rational expectations equilibrium, but that  ( ) 2 x t  cannot.  Suppose that  () 2 x t  is part of 
an REE.  At  () 2 x t , higher 
* t  values are associated with larger x values.  This solution is 
not one that will be produced by agents choosing optimally conditional on their commonly 
shared belief that  () 2 x t  is an equilibrium; this contradiction follows from Assumption A.3 
that the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to x is positive.  Hence only 
() 1 x t  has the potential to be part of an REE solution.  This type of argument generalizes 
to produce Lemma 3; the proof is trivial given our previous results and is therefore 
omitted. 
 
Lemma 3. Monotonicity along equilibrium adoption paths 
 
Given A.1-A.4, along an equilibrium adoption path  ( ) ( ) ( )
** 1 X qt F xt =− , 
  
A. the process for optimal adoption times  ( )
* tx  must obey  0
dx
dt
<  for points of 
differentiability.  
 
B. At jumps, larger x  types adopt earlier than smaller x  types. 
   
How does the possibility of nonmonotonicity of  ( ) Sx interact with the 
requirement that   0
dx
dt
<  holds in equilibrium?   The reconciliation of these requirements 
places restrictions on  ()
* qt .  Intuitively, in order to ensure that  0
dx
dt
< , at differentiable 
times it is necessary that for higher x’s, a sufficient number of adopters are present to 
ensure that adoption is monotonic in type.  In order for this to always hold, it may be 16 
 
necessary for the  ()
* qt  function to exhibit discontinuities.  This can produce 
discontinuities of the following form:  as t increases from slightly below 
* t  to slightly above 
* t , a mass point of size  () ( )
* 0 XX Fx Fx ′ −>  adopts where 
* x x ′<   is defined by 
 
  ( ) ( )
* . Sx Sx ′ =  (14) 
 
This jump in the number of adopters means that the  ( )
* tx  is never increasing in x. The 
adoption of a mass point at date 
* t  causes a jump of size  
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
* 0 XX qt qt F x F x
+− ′ − =−> , (15) 
 
to occur at time 
* tt = .  Hence an observable implication of social interactions, when the 
interactions are strong enough to induce a nonmonotonicity in the function  () Sx in x, is 
that there may exist at least one jump in  ( )
* qt .   
As our objective is to explicitly link discontinuities in the REE function  ()
* qt  to the 
identification of social interactions, we formulate a theorem for the particular case of  ( ) Sx 
in which the function has a single local minimum  min x  and a single finite local maximum 
max x ; Figure 1 illustrates the qualitative shape of  ( ) Sx that is assumed in the theorem  The 
structure of the theorem makes it evident that other formulations are possible.  While we 
conjecture that a more general theorem may be produced which directly maps the 
nonmonotonicity of  () Sx to discontinuities in  ( )
* qt , we have yet to show this; the 
difficulty is that in dynamic models, one needs to evaluate the best reply function against 
the full dynamic path of the associated adoption curve.  A parametric example of the 
theorem is provided in the Appendix. 
 
Theorem 1.  Discontinuities in the adoption curve as evidence of social interactions  
 17 
 
Given A.1-A.4, suppose that 
 
i.  () Sx is continuously differentiable in x,  ( ) 0 S = ∞, 
  
ii. () Sx is initially strictly decreasing in x, until it takes a positive local minimum at  min x , 
 
iii.  () Sx increases in the open interval ( ) min max , xx ,  
 
iv.  () Sx takes a unique local maximum at  max min x x > , and then strictly decreases in x for 
all  max x x >  until some point  max x x >   is reached 
   
v. For all  () , 0 xx S x ><  .   
 
Define  *m i nm a x x xx << via  ( ) ( )
*
max * tS x S x == .  Then,  
 
A. There exists an REE,  ()
* qt  defined by,  ( ) ( ) ( )
** 1 X qt F xt =− , for which  ()
* x t  satisfies 
the equation, 
 
  ( ) ( )
* tS x t =  (16) 
 
where  ()
* x t  is defined to be the largest solution to the equation  ()
* , for  tS x tt = ≤  and 
()
* x t  is defined to be the unique solution to the equation  ( )
* , for  tS x tt = > where 
()
*
max tS x = . 
 
B. There exists one jump point of positive size in the equilibrium adoption curve  ( )
* qt  
which occurs at  ()
*
max tS x = , 
 18 
 
C. There is a mass point, () 1 X Fx −  , at  0 t = .   
 
  This discontinuity property represents a variant of a partial identification 
argument in econometrics, cf. Manski (2003).  By this, we mean that the presence of social 
interactions can, for certain magnitudes of the interactions, place restrictions on observable 
data, but that these restrictions neither identify the exact magnitude of the interactions (in 
this case the effects of q on  () , x q π  nor are the restrictions necessary for the interactions 
to be present
15.  The presence of a discontinuity means that in comparing the adoption 
model with and without social interactions, i.e. comparing the implications of the 
dependence of the profit function on q, a discontinuity may be interpreted as evidence of 
social interactions.  However, the absence of a discontinuity does not imply that social 
interactions are absent. The discontinuity property requires that the strength of the 
influence of social interactions is large.  Given the absence of any restrictions on  ( ) , x q π  
beyond Assumption A.2, one cannot be more precise about what is meant by larger; if a 
f u n c t i o n a l  f o r m  w e r e  c h o s e n  i n  w h i c h  a  p a rameter measured the strength of social 
interactions, then one could interpret the presence of discontinuities as a statement about 
the parameter’s magnitude.  “Large” is model-specific. 
  Of course, discontinuities in  ( ) X F x  can produce discontinuities in  ()
* qt  even 
when social interactions are absent.  If individual adoption times and associated values of  x 
are observable (so that  () X F x  is observable), this alternative explanation can be assessed as 
any discontinuity at  d t  would have to align with a discontinuity at  d x  so that  ()
*
dd tx t = .  
An example in the hybrid corn context is the date 1936 when the news that hybrid corn 
produced much more then open pollinated varieties in that drought year spread like 
wildfire through the farming community and caused the demand for hybrid seed to 
explode (Sutch (2008, page 18)).  This would look like a jump in the data but would not be 
                                                 
15Our form of partial identification differs from that typically found in Manski’s work as his 
approach produces bounds on unknown objects of interest whereas ours uncovers the sign 
of an object of interest (the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to adoption) 
and information about the magnitude as it affects the equilibrium behavior of the adoption 
curve.  19 
 
due to social interactions in the sense that the jump is not caused by  0
q
π ∂
>
∂
.  Of course if 
one conditions on relative yield information in 1936, separation of causes of jumps in 
adoption rates due to  0
q
π ∂
>
∂
 in contrast to an exogenous driver of jumps (such as 
information on the relative productivity of hybrid corn in drought conditions) should be 
possible.
16     
  Once one introduces individual heterogeneity, it is possible to develop empirical 
implications of social interactions which do not rely on the presence of jumps.  For 
example, if one observes the adoption under two different distributions of observed 
heterogeneity, one of which stochastically dominates the other, the absence of social 
interactions places strong restrictions on the associated adoption curves.  
 
Theorem 2. Stochastic dominance and the absence of social interactions 
 
Suppose that the distribution function  ( ) ,1 X F ⋅  (with associated adoption curve  () 1 qt) is 
stochastically dominated by the distribution function  ( ) ,2 X F ⋅  (with associated adoption 
curve  () 2 qt . If there are no social interactions, i.e.  ( ) ( ) , x qx ππ = , then it must be the 
case that  () () 12 qt qt ≤  for all t.   
 
 
  The application of this Theorem would require that a researcher is able to 
identify distinct cases of adoption under different  ( ) , Xi F ⋅ ’s.   
                                                 
16One might argue that in the hybrid corn historical record our model is most relevant to 
the period after the 1936 jump.  Following Sutch (2008), this is so because of the 
combination of the key initial role of Henry Agard Wallace in promoting the use of hybrid 
corn and the fact that it did not dramatically expand until prompted by the news of the very 
high relative yields in the drought year, 1936.  Sutch discusses the continued improvement 
of varieties of hybrid corn, the role of demonstration plots, the sharing of information 
about tailoring varieties to specific land types and the role of agricultural extension offices 
in the diffusion process of hybrid corn. 20 
 
 
 
5.  Unobservable heterogeneity 
 
In this section we introduce unobservable heterogeneity and consider how 
empirical implications are affected.  Interestingly, unobservable heterogeneity can produce 
a different route to uncovering social interactions that is not present when the heterogeneity 
is absent.  We focus on the case of one observable and one unobservable.  Before doing 
so, we first illustrate how this case can capture key features of the general case of multiple 
observables and multiple unobservables, so long as π  is monotonically increasing in all 
variables.  An elementary result in functional separability theory as applied to general utility 
theory (Varian (1992, p. 150)) is that for a vector  x and scalar q, if 1)  () , x q π  is strictly 
increasing in both arguments and 2)  ( ) ( ) ,, x qx q ππ ′ ≥  if and only if  ()( ) ,' , ' x qx q ππ ′ ≥  
for all x,  x′,  q and q′, then there exists a “subprofit” function  ( ) ux (mapping  x to a 
scalar) and an aggregator function  ( ) , Vu q such that 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, x qV u x q π = . (17) 
 
If  () , Vu q is strictly increasing in ( ) , uq one may simply repeat our earlier analysis by 
replacing  x in the above analysis with u .  Hence in an REE, it must be the case that 
() 1 U qF u =− .  In an REE, when  ( ) , Vu q is independent of q, individuals with higher 
levels of u  adopt first.   When   ( ) , Vu q varies in q, the best response adoption times for 
individuals with level u  is given by 
 
  () () ()
1
( ) ln ln ,1 U Su C Vu F u
a
ρ =− −  (18) 
 
In parallel to our earlier discussion, the unconditional equilibrium adoption curve is given 
by  21 
 
 
  ( ) ( )
* 1 U qt Ft =−  (19) 
 
where  
 
 
() ( ) () () () ( ) () ()
() () () () ()
** * *
**
1
ln ln ,1  if  0
0 if ln , 0 ln .
U tu C ut Fut tu
a
tu u q C
ρπ
πρ
=− − >
<≥
 (20) 
 
(Note that since we are focusing only on positive adoption times, we use the convention 
that we just state  ()
* tu  for negative adoption times even though the equality still holds for 
negative adoption times.)  
Functional separability provides a general strategy for introducing unobservables.  
Suppose that productivity is a vector rather than a scalar attribute.  Partition the vector as 
() 11 , x xx − =  where  1 x  is observable and  1 x−  is not.  We may now repeat our earlier 
analysis to conditional adoption curves  ( )
*
1 qt x.  These curves must obey 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
1
*
1|1 1| UX qt x F u t x =− . (21) 
 
This indicates how the scalar observable/ scalar unobservable case we consider is in fact 
quite general. 
We now focus on  () 12 , x xx = , where each component is one dimensional.  Notice 
that if one had infinite data on each “cell” 1 x , i.e. one observes the conditional adoption 
curve  () 1 | qtx  for every  1 x , then this would be enough to “reveal” the one dimensional 
unobservable  2 x  except at those dates when nonmonotonicity of the conditional best 
response time  () 21 | Sx x occurs.   To put it another way if the function  () 21 | Sx x is one-to-
one for all  1 x  then knowledge of the conditional adoption curves at t and the observable 22 
 
covariate  1 x  reveals the unobservable  2 x .  On the other hand when the function  () 21 | Sx x 
is not monotone in  2 x  for some  1 x  then our results derived above on the characterization 
of REE’s apply, i.e. there will typically be a discontinuous burst of adoption as time t 
passes through a critical value where the function is not monotone for this particular value 
of  1 x .  
  Without any restrictions on the unobservables, one cannot identify any 
observable implications for social interaction effects on adoption curves.   Any adoption 
pattern that is generated with social interactions can be replicated with them by suitable 
choice of the process describing the unobservable variable.   We proceed by using a 
“weak” assumption on the unobservable: 
 
A.5. 
21 XX F  is stochastically increasing in  1 X  in the sense that  11 x x ′ ′′ >  implies 
 
  ( ) ( )
21 21 21 21 XX XX Fx x Fx x ′ ′′ ≤ . (22) 
 
Stochastic dominance is an example of a shape restriction.  Shape restrictions are not only 
weaker than functional form restrictions, they are often interpretable in economic terms in 
ways that functional forms are not.  For example, if one thinks of individual farmers as 
characterized by an unobservable ability level and an observable education level, then 
stochastic dominance says nothing more than higher education levels imply that the density 
of abilities is shifted to the right. Brock and Durlauf (2007) show how stochastic dominance 
can facilitate identification of social interactions, using partial identification arguments.   
This work, in turn, draws from Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000) who 
emphasize the constructive role of assumptions such as shape restrictions.  
 
Theorem 3.  Monotonicity of adoption curves with respect to observables.  
 
Given A.1-A.5, suppose that both the observables  1 x  and the unobservables  2 x  are one 
dimensional.   23 
 
 
A.  If there are no social interactions, i.e.  ( ) 12 ,,
0
xxq
q
π ∂
=
∂
 
 
  ( ) ( ) 11 1 1  implies      0. xx q t x q t x t ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ >> ∀ ≥  (23) 
 
B. If  
 
  ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 but , x xq t x q t x ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ >>  (24) 
 
then it must be the case that  () 12 ,,
0
xxq
q
π ∂
≠
∂
. 
 
  The theorem is intuitive.  One expects agents with higher values of observable 
characteristics  1 x  to have better values of unobservable characteristics on average and, 
hence, to have higher profits on average which cause more of them to adopt at any given 
observed date.  This argument in turns leads to the idea of a pattern reversal as evidence of 
social interactions.  A pattern reversal occurs when differences in characteristics between 
two populations of agents suggest one relationship between the associated group behaviors 
whereas the opposite is observed.  In our context, a pattern reversal occurs if the one group 
is adopting more rapidly than another, whereas the private incentives experienced by 
members of each group predict the opposite pattern.  Corollary 1 formalizes this idea and 
follows immediately from Theorem 3.  
 
   
Corollary 1.  Pattern reversals and order reversals 
 
Assume A.1-A.5.  Suppose there exists a fixed time  0 t  such that for  11 x x ′ ′′ >   
 24 
 
  ( ) ( ) 01 01 , qt x qt x ′ ′′ <  (25) 
 
i.e. a greater percentage of low type agents have adopted by  0 t  than high types.  Then 
either  () ()
21 21 21 21 XX XX Fx x Fx x ′′ ′ >  or  ( ) 12 ,,
0
xxq
q
π ∂
≠
∂
. 
 
  As a special case of the Theorem and Corollary, if  1 x  and  2 x  are independent, 
then a pattern reversal is interpretable as evidence of social interactions.   
  Our earlier remarks on functional separability indicate that Theorem 3 and 
Corollary 1 generalize beyond the scalar observable/scalar unobservable case.  Following 
our earlier discussion, let the profit function equal  ( ) 11 ,, x xq π −  and assume that the profit 
function is increasing in all arguments.  Assume there exist monotone increasing scalar 
valued functions V and u such that  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 ,, , , x xq V x u x q π −− = .  One can then replace 
the scalar  1 x−  in the argument leading to Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 with the scalar 
() 1 ux −  and obtain generalizations to an arbitrary number of unobservables.  Of course, the 
functional separability of payoffs with respect to a vector of unobservables may be more 
difficult to justify based on heuristic economic reasoning. 
 
 
6.  Comparisons to other approaches to uncovering social interactions in adoption 
 
  In this section, we consider some previous approaches which have been proposed 
for uncovering social interactions via adoption curves. 
 
A. logistic functions and adoption curves 
 
It is often claimed that logistic adoption curves are evidence of social interactions; 
Schelling (1997) provides an overview of interpretations of logistic curves as evidence of 
social effects; see also Geroski (2000).  This type of argument typically derives from a view 25 
 
of social interactions as a type of infection phenomena in which the fraction of those who 
have not adopted,  () 1 qt − , changes via  
 
  ( ) () () () 1.
dq t
Rqt qt
dt
=−  (26) 
 
See Daley and Gani (2001) for discussion of this equation in epidemiology and Berndt, 
Pindyck and Azoulay (2003) for an example of an analysis that employs this type of 
equation to empirically model social effects on diffusion
17.   
For our model, a logistic curve does not represent evidence of social effects.  In our 
model, the derivative of the adoption curve is 
 
  () () () () () () ()
1
1, XX X
dq t dS x
f x R Fx Fx
dt dx
−
⎛⎞
=− = − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (27) 
 
and can be constructed by solving the ordinary differential equation,  
 
  () ( )
() () () 1
X
XX
fx
Sx
R FxFx
′ =−
−
. (28) 
 
But it follows from the definition of  ( ) Sx that 
 
  () ( )
()
1 x
Sx
ax
π
π
′ ⎛⎞ ′ =−⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. (29) 
 
                                                 
17Interestingly, Griliches (1962) defended himself against the claim by Havens and Rogers 
(1961) that he ignored social factors by arguing that his use of logistic curves captured 
“interaction.” 26 
 
Hence, given  () X f x  (and the associated distribution function  ( ) X Fx ), in order to have a 
logistic dynamic of the form (26) generated by our model, all one must do is to construct a 
() x π  function that satisfies the equation, 
 
  () () () () ( )
() () () ()
0
0 ln ln
1
x X
x
XX
fx a
x xd x
R FxFx
ππ −=
− ∫ , (30) 
 
for some lower bound  0 x .  This indicates how logistic dynamics can result from the shape 
of the profit function  () x π  with no implication about social interactions in the adoption 
process.  Since the profit function is not observable, one cannot use the shape of the 
adoption curve to infer anything about social interactions.  Put differently,  () x π  represents 
a latent variable that varies across types and is therefore interpretable as a form of 
unobserved heterogeneity; eq. (30) shows that the mapping of a logistic curve to social 
interactions is not robust when this type of heterogeneity is present.   
  One can develop a parallel analysis to demonstrate that, in the context of our 
model, logistic adoption curves may be generated in absence of social interactions.     
Suppose that the profit function does not embody social interactions and has the form 
 
  ( ) ,,  0 < < 1 xq A x
α π α =  (31) 
 
Mimicking our earlier arguments, profit maximization implies that equilibrium adoption 
times are implicitly defined by 
 
  ()
()
1/
/ at C
xt e
A
α
α ρ − ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (32) 
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Previous arguments establish that  () X
dq dx
fx
dt dt
=−   therefore (32) implies 
dx ax
dt α
=− .  
Further, (26) indicates the necessary condition for a logistic adoption curve. Combining 
these yields the following differential equation for  ( ) X F x . 
 
  ( )
() () () 1
X
XX
dF x ad x
r
x Fx Fx α
=
−
 (33) 
 
Integrating both sides of (33) (using partial fractions for the LHS) one obtains the solution 
 
  ()
/
0
0 /
0
, 0
1
ra
X ra
cx
Fx c
cx
α
α = >
+
 (34) 
 
and 
 
  ()
0
0 1
rt
d
qt
de
− =
+
 (35) 
 
where the constant 
/
00
ra C
dc
A
ρ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.  This is a logistic function.    
Our demonstration that a logistic shape may arise from a variant of our model 
without interactions derives from a particular distribution function  () X F x .  One can 
therefore object that this is a knife edge case.  However, the derivation of a logistic curve 
itself depends on special functional form assumptions.  Further, as originally noted by 
Feller (1940) and further argued in Brock (1999) and Dinardo and Winfree (2007), it is 
very difficult to distinguish logistic functions from other S-shaped functions.  This has led to 
some authors arguing that social versus individual explanations of adoptions are 
distinguished by accelerating versus nonaccelerating adoption curve shapes
18.  We note 
                                                 
18Reader (2004, p. 90) argues that this view is especially true in social learning models: “In 
general, social learning processes are argued to result in accelerating diffusion curves, such 28 
 
here that our argument on the inability of the logistic to differentiate presence or absence 
of social interactions immediately adapts to this case
19. 
 
B. relative acceleration rates 
 
Young (2007) is a recent effort that employs adoption curve shapes to uncover 
social interactions.  His analysis is based on a function he calls the relative acceleration rate, 
which measures the rate of change of the adoption curve when different fractions of 
adoptions have occurred. Formally, letting r  denote the fraction of the population that as 
adopted, the relative acceleration rate equals  
 
  () () ( ) ()
2
2 evaluated at   where  . rr
dqt d qt
gr t qt r
dt dt
==  (36) 
 
Young argues that for one type of social interactions model, a social learning process (in 
which each agent updates beliefs about the relative payoffs between adoption and 
nonadoption based on observed choices of others), the relative acceleration rate may be 
increasing whereas in another type of social interactions model, a contagion process (in 
which each agent adopts when he comes into contact with someone else who has adopted), 
the relative acceleration rate can never increase.  
  To understand the behavior of the relative acceleration rate in our model, algebraic 
manipulation reveals that, even when social interactions are absent, the relative acceleration 
rate for our model is 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
as the logistic, exponential or the hyperbolic sine...Cumulative distributions characterized 
by nonaccelerating functions (e.g. linear or logarithmic) are thought to be compatible with  
asocial (individual) learning models.”  Reader notes that this holds for prominent studies 
such as Boyd and Richerson (1985).   
19See Manuelli and Seshadri (2008) for a different framework in which S-shaped adoption 
curves are produced without social interactions. 
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  () ()
() ()
() () () () () ()
12
* ** 2 ** **
*
2 ()  
Xr r r r
Xr
df x t dt x t d t x t dt x t
gr f x t
dx dx dx dx
− −
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ =−
⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (37) 
 
where the quantities are evaluated at  ( )
*
r x t .  Additional algebraic manipulation produces 
 
  () ()
() () () ()
() ()
() () () ()
() () () () () ()
1
**
*
12
** 2 * *
**
2
()
.
rX
r
Xr r r
Xr
gr
dx t d fx t
ax t
dx dx
d f xt d xt d xt d xt
fx t x t
dx dx dx dx
π
π
ππ π
π
−
−
=
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ×
⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +− ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
(38) 
 
For our purposes, what is important about this expression is that one can manufacture a 
wide variety of shapes of  () gr by varying the values of   ( ) X df x
dx
 and  ()
2
2
dx
dx
π
 .  Economic 
theory of course does not restrict these functions. Hence, the relative acceleration rate is 
not restricted by our forward looking model.   By implication, one cannot distinguish types 
of social interactions, i.e. contagion versus social learning. Again,  () X df x
dx
 and  ( )
2
2
dx
dx
π
 
constitute forms of unobserved heterogeneity that break any logical link between the shape 
of the adoption curve and social interactions.    
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
  In this paper we have analyzed a model of adoption decisions in which social 
interactions are present.  Our analysis indicates that even in the presence of observable and 
unobservable heterogeneity, it is possible to uncover properties of adoption curves that 
observationally differentiate environments in which social interactions matter from those 
that do not.   30 
 
While we have not translated these observational differences into econometric 
analogs, their presence provides a basis for constructing formal econometric tests.  For 
jumps in the adoption curve  () qt in continuous time data sets, there exist a number of 
methods from the time series and finance literatures that allow for the identification of 
jumps in stochastic processes - Ait-Sahalia (2004), Ait-Sahalia and Jacod (2008) and 
Barndoff-Neilson and Shephard (2006) are major recent contributions.  For cases where 
data are measured in discrete time, these formal methods will not be applicable.   
Nevertheless, the jumps we find in discrete time translate into large changes in a discretely 
sampled adoption curve. If one finds that adoption increases slowly, suddenly increases 
rapidly at one time increment, and then increases slowly again, this is suggestive of a jump 
in the underlying continuous adoption process.  Notice that this type of finding is much 
sharper than the finding of an S-shaped adoption curve, which we in fact have argued is not 
a robust implication of social interactions models.   While assessing whether a particular 
change in an adoption curve is too large to be plausibly associated with fundamentals 
requires judgment, this does not invalidate its utility. 
Pattern reversals are also in principle estimable. For this case, the empirical objects 
of interest are pairs of conditional adoption curves  ( ) qtx ′  and  ( ) qtx ′′ , where x x ′ ′′ >  
and one can assume that private incentives to adopt are increasing in x.  Recalling 
Theorem 3, the absence of a pattern reversal requires that  ( ) ()   qtx qtx t ′ ≥∀ .  This 
requirement in turn is a form of stochastic dominance requirement (on adoption curves) 
and may be assessed using methods developed in Barrett and Donald (2003) and Linton, 
Maasoumi, and Whang (2005). Unlike the jump case, pattern reversal claims are not 
sensitive to whether continuous time or discrete time data are available. 
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Figure 1 
 
Shape of  ( ) Sx in Theorem 1 
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Appendix 1: Proofs of Theorems 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
 
  Assumption A.1 implies that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, 1
e x qt x ππ ≤   t ∀ .  Suppose by way of 
contradiction that there exist two optimal times  12 tt <  such that.   ( )() 12 ,, Jtx Jt x =  when 
each is evaluated for a given set of beliefs  ( )
e qt .  There are four cases to  consider  (i)  
()
e qt  is differentiable at both t’s,  (ii)  ( )
e qt  is differentiable at  1 t  but not  2 t , (iii)  ( )
e qt  is 
differentiable at  2 t  but not  1 t , (iv)  ( )
e qt  is not differentiable at either t.  For each of the 
cases,  () () ,0 , iI Jtx Jtx
−+ ′′ ≥≥  by eq. (4). Using the representation in (4) and cancelling off 
t e
ρ − , it must be the case that  
 
  ( ) () ( ) ( ) ,0 ,
ii at at ee
ii Ce x qt Ce x qt ρπ ρπ
−+ −≥ ≥ − (A.1) 
 
  By Assumption A.2 any jump in  ( )
e qt  must be positive.  Thus any jump in 
() () ,
i at e
i Ce x qt ρπ
− −   can only jump down if it jumps at all.  Since  () () 12
ee qt qt
+− ≤  by 
A.2, we have a contradiction to eq. (A.1).  To see this, consider the RHS of eq. (A.1) for  1 t : 
 
  () () ( ) ( ) () ( )
122
112 0, , , 0
at at at eee Ce x qt Ce x qt Ce x qt ρπ ρπ ρπ
++− ≥− >− >− ≥  (A.2) 
 
The second inequality between the 0’s follows because  12 tt <  and the third inequality 
follows from monotonicity of  ( ) , π ⋅ ⋅  and  ( ) ( ) 12
ee qt qt
+ − ≤ .   W e  t h u s  a r r i v e  a t  a  
contradiction.  This argument addresses all four cases and ends the proof. 
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Proof of Lemma 2. 
 
Suppose by way of contradiction that  1 tt < . Since  1 t  is optimal, 
 
  () () ( ) ( ) () () ( ) 11 1 1 1 0, e x p , e x p , 0 .
ee g x t C at x q t C at x q t ρπ ρ π
−− + ≤= − < − ≤  (A.3) 
 
This chain of inequalities follows from optimality of  1 t , the assumptions  11  and  tt xx << , 
and the implication of Assumption A.2 that  ( ) ( ) 1
ee qt qt
− + ≥ .  As eq. (A.3) is internally 
contradictory, it must be the case that  1 tt ≥ ⁫. 
 
 
Proof of Theorem 1. 
 
We first prove that the candidate REE above is an REE.  It will help to follow the 
argument if one considers the graph of  ( ) Sx with x on the horizontal axis and S  on the 
vertical axis.   
Let  () , 1 ,2,3 i xt i =  denote the smallest, middle and largest solutions of the 
equation,  () tS x = ; when the solution is unique, these solutions simply coincide. Note that 
for  () ()
*
*m i n m a x ,  tS x tS x ==  there are two distinct values of x, 
*
* and  x x  such that 
() ()
**
**  and  tS x tS x == .  Note that 
*
*m i nm a x x xxx < << . We will use the notation 
() ()
1
ii x tSt
− =  when it is useful.  For  * tt < , the large  x solution,  ( ) 3 x t  is the only solution 
of the equation  () tS x = , so intuitively it must be an REE, if an REE exists at all.  For 
* tt >  the small x  solution  ( ) 1 , x t  is the only solution of the equation  () tS x =  so 
intuitively it must be an REE, if an REE exists at all.  The first step in the proof of the 
theorem is to formally demonstrate that the large x solution is part of an REE.  The same 
type argument will also imply that the small  x solution is part of an REE.   In other words, 34 
 
for each x, we need to prove that the optimal 
* t  is the part of  ( ) Sx described in the 
theorem statement.  Since we showed in Lemma 1 that, for each fixed x, there can be at 
most one solution to the necessary conditions for a local maximum of  () , Jtx all we need 
to do is show that the relevant parts of  ( ) Sx satisfy the set of necessary conditions for each 
x.   
Consider first  max x x > .  By the implicit function theorem, the implicit function 
() 0 Sz τ −= has a well defined solution  ( ) ( )
1
3 zS τ τ
− =  in an open neighborhood of the 
point () , tx (given that   () 0 Sx ′ < ).  We claim that  
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
1
3 ,, 1 (
a
X Jx e C exF S
ρτ τ τ ρπ τ
−− ′ =−−  (A.4) 
 
equals 0 at  () tS x τ ==  and is decreasing for all τ  in an open neighborhood of t, i.e. t is 
a local maximum of  () , Jx τ .  Substituting  ( ) Sx τ =  into  ( ) , Jx τ  and using the definition 
of  () Sx and the identity  ( ) ()
1
3 SS x x
− =  it is evident that  ( ) ,0 Jx τ ′ =  at  ( ) tS x τ == .  
Since  () . x q π  and  () X F x  are, by assumption, continuously differentiable, and since by the 
implicit function theorem,  ()
1
3 Sz
−  is differentiable at zx = , it must be the case that 
() , Jx τ  is differentiable at  t τ = .  Since  ( )
1
3 Sz
−  is strictly decreasing, we find by direct 
computation that  () ,0 Jx τ ′′ <  at  t τ =  by using  ( ) ,0 Jx τ ′ =  at  t τ = .  Hence the best 
reply property for an REE is satisfied for  max x x > .  The argument extends to  max x x =  by 
taking right hand limits.  Define  *m i nm a x x xx < <  to be the smaller value of the two values of 
x that satisfy the equation  ()( ) max * Sx Sx = .  The same argument as above shows that the 
best reply property is satisfied for  * x x < .   
We next verify that the optimal t for  *m a x [, ] xx x ∈  is  ( )()
*
*m a x tS x S x == .  We do 
max x  first.  If one inserts  max x x = , into J′ evaluated at 
* t , one sees immediately that 35 
 
()
*
max ,0 Jtx ′ = .  If one replaces 
* t  by a slightly smaller value of t,  J′ will be negative at 
max x x =  (on the branch  () ( )
1
33 x tSt
− = ).   
We next consider  * x .  This requires us to show that the derivative  
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
** ** * ,,
ta t Jtx e Ce x qt
ρ ρπ
−− ′ =−  (A.5) 
 
is positive (negative) for t slightly less (greater) than 
* t  for 
() () max max
1
*l n
,1
C
t
a xF x
ρ
π
=
−
.  
Now put  * x x = , but evaluate  ( )
*, Jtx ′  in an interval around 
* t , i.e. compute  right limits 
and left limits at 
* t .  (Note that for the left limit we will be on the branch 
() () ()
*1 *
3 1,   X qs FS s st
− =− <  and for the right limit we will be on the branch 
() () ()
*1 *
1 1,   X qs FS s st
− =− > ).  The left limit as t approaches 
* t  from below of  ( )
*, Jtx ′  
is easily seen to be given by  
 
  ()
( ) ( )
() ()
* *m a x *
*
max max
,1
,1 0
,1
X t
X
xF x
Jt x e C
xF x
ρ π
ρ
π
−− ⎛⎞ −
′ =− > ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. (A.6) 
 
This same inequality holds for all  [ ) *m a x , xx x ∈  since π  is assumed to be strictly increasing 
in  x.  Notice that  ()
* , Jt x
− ′  above is the marginal gain to waiting an extra day to adopt 
before the jump in 
* q .   
Next, compute the right hand limit of  ( ) , Jt x ′  as t approaches 
* t  from above.  
The atom  () ( ) max * XX Fx Fx −  has now adopted.  Compute  ( )
*, Jtx ′  at 
* t to obtain 
 
  ()
( ) ( )
() ()
* ** *
*
max max
,1
,1 0
,1
X t
X
xF x
Jtx e C
xF x
ρ π
ρ
π
− ⎛⎞ −
′ =− = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
, (A.7) 
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because, by the definition of  * x ,  ( ) ( ) *m a x Sx Sx =  implies that 
() () ( ) () ** m a xm a x ,1 ,1 XX xF x x F x ππ −=−  and  ()
() ()
1
ln
,1 X
C
Sx
a x Fx
ρ
π
=
−
.  We will be 
finished once we show that  ()
* ,, Jt x q ′  is negative for t  slightly bigger than 
* t .  We have  
 
  ()
() ( ) ( )
() ()
*
**
*
max max
,
,1
,1
t
X
xq t
Jt x e C
xF x
ρε πε
ερ
π
−+ ⎛⎞ +
⎜⎟ ′ += −
⎜⎟ −
⎝⎠
. (A.8) 
 
Define  () () ()
() ()
**
max max
,
1
,1 X
xq t
h
xF x
πε
ε
π
+
=−
−
.  It is clear from (24) that the sign of  ()
* , Jt x ε ′ +  
must be the same as  () h ε .  Since  ( ) h ε  is continuously differentiable at  0 ε = , it has a 
Taylor expansion,  () () ( ) ( ) 00 hhh o ε εε ′ =+ +.   We first show that  () 00 h <   Recall that 
() ()
**
0* lim 1 X qt F x ε ε −> += −  because under 
* q  the atom  () ( ) max * XX Fx Fx −  is 
anticipated to have already adopted for dates t slightly greater than 
* t .  From this, we 
obtain 
 
  ()
( ) ( )
() ()
*
max max
,1
01 0
,1
X
X
xF x
h
xF x
π
π
−
=− <
−
. (A.9) 
   
We next show that  () 00 h′ <   This derivative equals  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
() () ()
** *
** *
,1
(0) 0
,1
qX X
X
xF x f x
ha
Sx x F x
π
π
−
′ =− + <
′ −
, (A.10) 
 
which is negative because  () * 0 Sx ′ < .  This completes the proof for  * x x = . 37 
 
The proof for each  () *m a x , xx x ∈  proceeds as follows.  We have already shown that 
the left hand limit of  ()
*, Jtx ′  is positive for each such x.  We must now show that the 
right hand limit of   ()
*, Jtx ′  is negative for each such x.  We have 
 
  ()
() ( ) ( )
() ()
*
**
*
max max
,
,1
,1
t
X
xq t
Jt x e C
xF x
ρε πε
ερ
π
−+ ⎛⎞ +
⎜⎟ ′ += −
⎜⎟ −
⎝⎠
. (A.11) 
 
Define  () () ()
() ()
**
max max
,
1
,1 X
xq t
h
xF x
πε
ε
π
+
=−
−
.   W e  s h o w  t h a t   ( ) 00 h < .  Recall that 
() ()
**
0* lim 1 X qt F x ε ε −> += −  because under 
* q  the atom  () ( ) max * XX F xF x −  is 
anticipated to have already adopted for dates t slightly greater than 
* t .  From this, we 
obtain 
 
  ()
( ) ( )
() ()
*
max max
,1
01 0
,1
X
X
xF x
h
xF x
π
π
−
= −<
−
 (A.12) 
 
because  () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) max max * ,1 ,1 ,1 XX X x Fx x Fx x Fx ππ π −< − < −  for  () *m a x , xx x ∈ . This 
completes the proof. 
 
 
Proof of Theorem 2. 
 
  If there are no social interactions,  ( ) ( ) , x qx ππ = .  Hence the equation 
() ()
1ln
C
tS x a
x
ρ
π
− ⎛⎞
==⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 has a unique solution for each t.  Denote 
() () ()
1
, 1 iX i qt F S t
− =− .  Therefore,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ()
11
1, 1 2, 2 11 XX qt F S t qt F S t
−− =− ≤ =− , 
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by stochastic dominance.  
 
 
Proof of Theorem 3. 
 
The proof of the first part is obtained from a straightforward chain of inequalities 
that exploits the assumption that  ( ) 12 , x x ππ =  is independent of qand is strictly increasing 
in both x’s as well as Assumption A.5,  Formally, 
 
 
() ( ) ( )
() () () () ()
21
21 21
1
11 1
11
11 11 1
|1 | |
1| | 1| | |
XX
XX XX
qtx F S tx x
FS t x x FS t x x q t x
−
−−
′′ ′ =− ≥
′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ −> −=
. (A.13) 
 
The first inequality follows from eq. (22) and the second follows from 
() ()
11
11 || St x St x
−− ′′ ′ > , which follows from  ( ) ( ) 21 21 || Sx x Sx x ′ ′′ > , an inequality which 
follows directly from the assumption that  ( ) 12 , x x π  is strictly increasing in the vector 
() 12 , x x .  Given the proof of the first part of the theorem, the proof of the second part is 
immediate.  This ends the proof. 
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Appendix 2 : Closed Form Example For Theorem 1. 
 
  Here we construct a parametric example of an environment of the type assumed 
in Theorem 1.  First, note that  ()
() ()
1ln
,
C
Sx a
x qx
ρ
π
− =  falls, then rises, then falls again if 
and only if  () ( ) , x qx π , where  ( ) ( ) 1 X qx F x =−  moves in the opposite way, i.e. rises, then 
falls, then rises. We therefore construct a  ( ) ( ) , x qx π  and  ( )( ) 1 qx Fx =−  that satisfies 
these last properties.  We will choose  1 0 A >  and construct two functions with the first 
f u n c t i o n  d e s i g n e d  s o  t h a t  i t  i s  c o n c a v e ,  c o ntinuously differentiable, and increases then 
decreases on () 1 0, A  and the second function defined on [ ) 1, A ∞  such that they join 
together to form a continuous function.  The parameters of these functions will be 
designed so they generate an example of Theorem 1.  This exercise will prove that 
Theorem 1 applies to a nontrivial set of examples.   
  We define the first function by 
 
  () () () () ( ) 1 ,1 xqx x K B F x
β α π =+ −  (A.14) 
 
where  0, 0, 1 α βα β >> + = ,  0 K > ,  0 B > and  ( ) X Fx  are chosen so that this function 
is continuously differentiable, concave, increases, takes a maximum; call it  min x  (because it 
is a local minimum of  () Sx, on ( ) 1 0, A , for appropriately chosen  1 0 A > , and decreases to 
the smaller value  () () ( ) ( ) 11 1 1m i n m i n ,, AqA x qx ππ < ).  Clearly  ( ) ( ) 0, 0 0 q π = .  As we will 
see below, this function will be concave, will increase to a maximum, then take a smaller 
value at  () () 11 ,1 X A FA π −  for appropriately chosen linear  ( ) X Fx  on  1 (0, ) A .   
 Our  second  function  will be defined by 
 
  () () () ( )( ) ( ) 21 1 1 1 1 2 1 ,1 ,1 ( ) ( ) XX X X x Fx A FA L xA LFA Fx ππ −=−+ − + − (A.15) 
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where  21 AA > ,  () X Fx  is chosen to be linear, and the other parameters are chosen so that 
() () 2 ,1 X x Fx π −  increases on [ ) 1, A ∞  and  ( ) ( ) () ( ) 22 2 1 m i n m i n ,1 ,1 XX AF A x F x ππ −>− . 
Note that the rightmost term comes from the term  ( ) ( ) ( ) 21 Lq x q A −  and that the two 
functions take the same value at  1 x A = .  Therefore the join is continuous at  1 x A = . We 
also choose  () X F x  so that it has positive support on [ ) 2 0, ,  SS x xA ≥   
  Return to the specification of the first function.  Compute 
 
 
( ) ( )
() ( ) () () ()
() () ()
() ()
1
1 1
1
,
(1 ( ) 1
,
1
XX X
X
X
dx q x
dx
x KB Fx xKB Fx B fx
Bf x a
xqx
x KB Fx
β β αα
π
αβ
β
π
− −
=
+− − +− =
⎛⎞
− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠
 (A.16) 
 
It is evident that this derivative is positive for small x, is 0 for some  min 0 x > , and is 
negative for larger x’s iff  ()
() () 1
X
X
Bf x a
x KB Fx
β ⎛⎞
− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠
 has the same properties.  We therefore 
choose  () X F x  to satisfy, 
 
 
() [ )
[ )
1
1
11
12
12
2
, 0, ,
,,
1,  
X
x
Fx x A
a
Ax A
x AA
aa
xA
=∈
−
=+ ∈
=≥
 (A.17) 
 
where we are free to choose all these parameters to get what we want and satisfy all the 
explicit and implicit constraints needed to get an example with just one jump.  It is easy to 41 
 
check that  1 π  rises for small x’s, takes a first zero at  () 1
min
aK B
x
B
α
αβ
+
=
+
, and is 
concave on () 1 0, A  so our first constraint on our parameter set is that  min 1 x A < .   
  Without loss of generality recall that we can assume that  1 α β +=  by taking a 
monotonic transformation.  Therefore we know that  1 π  is concave on () 1 0, A  so we know 
that we have identified a maximum on  1 (0, ) A .  We now wish to construct the “rest” of 
() X Fx  and the function  2 π  to produce a local minimum of π  at  1 A  and such that for 
some  21 AA > , we have  ( ) () ( ) ( ) 22 2 1 m i n m i n ,1 ,1 XX AF A x F x ππ −>−  before the end of the 
support of  () X Fx  is reached.  To do this, we identify parameters so that there is a local 
minimum of π  at  1 x A = .  We already know that the left hand derivative of  1 π π =  at 
1 x A =  is negative.  We must specify the parameters of  2 π  so that the right hand derivative 
of  2 π π =  is positive at 1 x A = .  This condition is satisfied if 
2
1
2
0
L
L
a
− > . 
  Finally we require 
1
1
1
A
a
<  and 
12 1
12
1
AAA
aa
−
+ ≤ . Since  ()
() ()
1
ln
,
C
Sx
a x qx
ρ
π
⎛⎞
= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
, 
we may choose  C ρ  large enough so that it is above π  evaluated at  min x  so that 
() min 0 Sx > .  We still have quite a bit of freedom to construct the rest of the example to 
illustrate Theorem 1.  Note that we have a nondifferentiability of  ( ) Sx at  1 x A =  whereas 
Theorem 1 assumes continuous differentiability of  ( ) Sx.  But the proof uses left and right 
limits so differentiability is not really needed.  In any event one can always locally smooth 
the construction at  1 x A = . 
  We still need to choose the parameters so that the local maximum value of π  is 
smaller than  () () 22 ,1 X AF A π −  so that we have a positive atom for our jump.  This is 
satisfied provided that 
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( ) ( )
() () () ( ) ( ) () () ()
22 2
11 1 12 1 2 1 2 1m i n m i n
,1
,1 ,1
X
XX X X
AF A
AF AL A A L F A F A x F x
π
ππ
−=
−+ − + −> −
(A.18) 
 
For simplicity, assume  12 0 aa <=.  The restrictions needed on the various parameters may 
be summarized as 
 
  ( ) 1 12 2
11
11 1
1,  ,   1,   0
aK B AA L
AL
aB a a
α +
<< ≤ − >  (A.19) 
 
and 
 
 
() ( )
()
21 2
12 1
1
2m i n 1
12 1 1 m i n 1 1
11 1
1
,1 ,
LA A
LA A
a
Lx A
LA Ax A
aa a
ππ
−
−+ =
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −
−− > − − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (A.20) 
 
  The approach we have outlined provides a method for the construction of a fairly 
large class of examples.  The construction illustrates that it is straightforward to construct a 
class of examples that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1 so that there is an atom jump.  
For example if one assumes that  0 K =  and  1 B = , it is clear that one can set  1 L  large 
enough and  2 L  small enough to satisfy all the above constraints.  Define  
 
 
( )
11
1
21
1
1
ln / ,1 , if 
1
ln / ,1 , if 
ρπ
ρπ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=− < ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=− ≥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
Sx
x
Cx x A
aa
x
Cx x A
aa
 (A.21) 
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Thus,  ()
*
1 tS A = , by continuity there is  ( )( )
*
*m i n 1 * 1 ,  x xA t S x S A << = = .  The size of 
the jump atom is  () ()
1*
1*
1
XX
Ax
FA Fx
a
−
−=.   
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